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The context of an epistemological and methodological approach to LIS
Regarding the theoretical foundations of Library and Information Science (LIS), this paper 
develops a new epistemological and methodological approach. The aims of this analysis work on 
several levels: firstly, the scientific features of LIS as a « science » (i.e., language, structure, 
knowledge, method, activity, ends, and values)1 ; secondly, the analysis of its characterization as 
an applied science as its scientific orientation during research ; and thirdly, the consideration of 
its status as artificial2 rather than social3. These aims deepen in the epistemological and 
methodological configuration of Library and Information Science, which in Spain is traditionally 
called Ciencias de la Documentación, or more recently, Información y Documentación.
Library and Information Science, which today is commonly called « Information Science », can 
be understood from two different viewpoints : the broad perspective and the narrow view. The 
broad perspective involves the disciplines generally working on the aims, processes and results of
archives, libraries and documentation centres. Meanwhile, the narrow view focuses on specific 
information processes such as : creation, acquisition, organization, evaluation, storage, retrieval, 
and dissemination of information. In this narrow view, there is a particular interest in the users of 
archives, libraries and documentation centres.
This paper analyzes the first option – the broad perspective – that involves a clear connection to 
epistemological and methodological issues. In this regard, there are three levels :
1. science in general, which considers any feature present in science (either natural sciences, 
social sciences, or the sciences of the artificial);
2. applied sciences, which take into account the features that distinguish them from basic 
sciences;
3. design sciences, which are the core of the sciences of the artificial4, to be considered in the 
realm of LIS.
Following these three steps, there are several sections. Firstly, the proposal analyzes LIS as 
involving the features of all sciences (i.e. language, structure, knowledge, method, authority, ends
and values). Secondly, there is the study of LIS as an applied science, which involves the 
consideration of tasks such as cataloguing, indexing, abstracting, etc. Thirdly, there is a reflection 
on the specific status of these elements, which leads to the consideration of them as « artificial », 
insofar as they come from a design related to processes and results.
The scientific status of Library and Information Science in the broad sense
When analyzing to what extent a discipline such as Library and Information Science is scientific 
in the broad sense, the first things to take into account are the features of the science. In this 
Revue de l’Enssib  •  n° 1  •  octobre 2013 1
 
regard, an inquiry into the nature of what is now called « Information Science » reveals that the 
following components ratify it as a science5 :
1. it has a specific language, different from those used in other disciplines ;
2.  it appears articulated in theories, whose structures are guided by the solution of concrete 
problems ;
3. it uses a type of knowledge that has distinguishing features with regard to other disciplines and 
permits the articulation of the other knowledge contents ;
4. it has a characteristic method, which is directed towards the solution of practical problems6 
and appears as a dynamic reality ; in so far as it moulds the advance of knowledge, and therefore, 
is affected by historicity ;
5. it is configured essentially as a social action, because science is a plural task (it articulates a set 
of activities which are controlled and guided in order to obtain aims)  ;
6. it is related to several values, either internal (coherence, simplicity) or external (public service, 
cultural vehicle, etc.) ;
7. it can be evaluated ethically both from an internal perspective (reliability, honesty, etc.) and 
from an external one (i.e. avoiding undesirable effects or negative consequences for users, etc.)7.
In accordance with these features, we can recognize that Information Science is actually a science,
because it fits the requirements already pointed out. Thus, Library and Information Science – 
understood in the broad sense – has the features that belong to any scientific activity related to an 
empirical realm (language, structure, knowledge, method…). The characterization of this 
discipline can be seen in the contribution of Tefko Saracevic8. His focus notes that Information 
Science has developed in two main areas of knowledge : the cluster domain and the orientation 
towards information retrieval.
The first, the so-called cluster domain, examines issues as diverse as analytical studies of 
literature, the investigation of texts as bearers of content, scientific communication, the social 
context and the use of information. In the second, the field of information retrieval is addressed 
according to C. Mooers as « the intellectual aspects of the information description, its 
specification for search and any systems, techniques and equipment used to perform this 
operation »9. This thematic research area has also been called retrieval cluster. It addresses 
scientific research tasks such as information retrieval theory and carries out practical applications 
of processes and information retrieval systems, user studies, library systems, OPACs 
performance, etc.
Tefko Saracevic thinks that there is a shared area limited to certain information processes 
between Information Science – understood in a restricted sense – and Library Science. Both play 
a social role and are related to the problem of the effective use of graphic records10. However, 
there are also striking divergences between the two sciences :
1. they differ in how they define and address problems ;
2. they are different in the type of theoretical issues that arise and in the obtained results (i.e. the 
resulting structures) ;
3. they have different types of theoretical and practical knowledge ;
4. they possess different tools and solutions to problems ;
5. they differ in the interdisciplinary relations that they maintain.
All these elements lead to the conclusion that Library Science and Information Science, strictly 
speaking, are in fact two distinct fields with strong interdisciplinary relations rather than a single 
field (or even, that one is a special case of the other).
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Thus, from a structural standpoint, the internal articulation of Information Science – in a current 
broad sense – is configured through its interdisciplinary feature11. This feature entails a 
confluence of common aims rather than the mere overlapping of different knowledge. In fact, 
there is a set of different knowledge domains that interact according to the previously outlined 
aims. This is especially evident in Information Science processes such as selection and 
acquisition of relevant documents, organization, representation, re-identification (retrieval), and 
in the transfer of the information contained in documents to human agents. However, even though
each of these areas can develop their own processes, it happens that they seek to achieve clearly 
differentiated aims.
From a structural standpoint, there are – in my opinion – a number of features that can be referred
to in Information Science – understood in the broad sense :
1. the disciplinary field of Information Science is structurally complex12 ;
2. it shows a type of organized complexity which is oriented to achieve the aims ;
3. its internal architecture shows features of a hierarchical structure containing components of a 
first level hierarchy and elements that correspond to a second level hierarchy ;
4. all its components involve dynamicity-historicity (i.e. they are not static elements but rather, 
are connected to the past and susceptible to future projections) ;
5. there is a feature of adaptability conceived as the ability to adapt to an environment strongly 
mediated by social and technological factors which are particularly unstable in time ;
6. it involves a clear transmission of values (for example, the insertion of the value of cultural 
components) ;
7. it holds implicit ethical values that, for example, influence the performance of documentary 
processes and also contribute to the modulation of the relationship with users ;
8. prediction and prescription also play a relevant role in Information Science (hence the 
importance of the extensive list of standards, guidelines, and rules provided by this field that 
contribute to increasing predictive ability, which in turn strengthens its scientific character)13.
In my view, Information Science – in the present sense, which includes the whole tradition of LIS
– is set up as a complex system. It comprises a large number of heterogeneous elements that seek 
different aims. Its core elements pivot on the research of two major types of components : on the 
one hand, documents in any format or support (documentary support) related to the processes of 
creation (representation), organization, re-identification (retrieval), and distribution of 
information; and moreover, the attention by users / clients to satisfy their information needs.
Information Science as an applied science
Following this analysis of LIS, Information Science – understood in a contemporary way – can be
seen as an applied science within the sphere of sciences of design14. Thus, it seems clear that this
discipline includes several relevant features :
1. Information Science is an applied science, which means that it is always working on aims, 
processes and results, instead of being a purely professional activity that varies from country to 
country (from a simple « art » to a « cultural technique »)15. Information Science is an empirical 
science whose aims, processes and results are well established. In contrast, Knowledge 
Organization (KO) might be considered differently in insofar as it has a narrower scope than 
Information Science.
2. Information Science is an example of a science of design, which involves the need for the 
sciences of the artificial. This means that Information Science (and, therefore, the old Library and 
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Information Science) cannot be merely part of the social sciences : it is a dual science (artificial 
and social).
Information Science is an applied science. From the beginning, it has focused on problem-solving
activity in a concrete sphere of mainly practical issues16. This kind of science has manageability 
as one central characteristic. It is not a basic science because the primary aim is not directly to 
achieve true or at least, highly plausible content. Thus, it is not specifically aimed at knowing 
reality but rather, at solving specific problems in a well-defined domain. For it to be a basic 
science, it would require the development of a science giving foundation to applications that 
perform Information Science (or Library Science).
Usually, this field displays a practical knowledge that acts on a material that does not offer itself 
initially. It normally works on what has been achieved by other disciplines, whether scientific in 
the usual sense (i.e. formal sciences, natural or human and social sciences) or where appropriate, 
in disciplines encompassed within technological knowledge (engineering, etc.). Therefore its 
concern is the whole spectrum of knowledge, so it is configured as a science of science.
Through both its aims and objectives and their means and results, Information Science is in 
principle an applied science. First, the aims sought are operational and concrete. It is focused, in 
effect, to select and acquire materials of interest (information in a broad sense). Then, it structures
it in a functional way : analyzing and properly ordering to enable its re-identification (retrieval) 
and use. Next it tries to get results that promote the spread of what has been achieved (i.e. the task
of communication).
Second, in line with these aims the means implemented are also operative both in Library Science
and in Information Science : in both cases it expressly seeks to solve concrete problems through 
specific and usually functional means. Moreover, the solution is the basis for the existence of 
these disciplines. Thus, to perform the above functions (acquire, process, re-identify (retrieve), 
and communicate) along with scientific knowledge, Information technologies are increasingly 
used (to the extent that in the case of admitting the existence of « technoscience », at certain times
Information Science could be considered in that way).
And in the third instance, it is noted that the results are also examined according to operational 
criteria because they are normally evaluated on the basis of the usability and usefulness of the 
achievements (which are suitable criteria for applied science). Users normally carry this out either
expressly or in an implicit way. This explains the importance of the external side of these 
disciplines, since it is a clear complement of internal components.
As an applied science, Information Science – in the broad sense – deals with two types of 
components or factors : internal and external. The internal components are those that articulate 
the criteria for acquisition, organization, storage, re-identification (retrieval) and dissemination of 
information (e.g. rules and guidelines for the execution of documentary analysis tasks as reliable 
as self-controlled) or the guidelines for the classification of knowledge. The external components 
are those related to the environment of this activity (for example, exogenous factors that have an 
influence on the design and implementation of the user’s services) and in a more general way, 
includes those factors which, in one way or another, are affected by the socio-cultural context that
demands information (cultural trends, social conditions, political influences, user knowledge 
profiles, etc.).
In its modus operandi, Information Science as applied science proceeds inversely to basic science
in such a way that it follows guidelines suggested by I. Niiniluoto17. Therefore, at first in applied 
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science a concrete problem is set up to which a solution should be found instead of disposing of it
as with basic science – a direct search of new knowledge based in a theoretical framework18. The
framework that serves as support comes from a set of disciplines which may include computer 
science, linguistics, cognitive psychology and philosophy of science19. It may be the case that, in 
the future, the cognitive sciences can develop a basis for a future basic science of information. If 
this possibility is achieved, then the cognitive sciences can give additional support for 
Information Science as a design applied science20.
Information Science as Science of design
Once the aims are indicated, the more relevant features and distinguishing aspects of LIS are as a 
design science21. If we accept that « design, like science, is a tool for understanding as well as for
acting »22, then we could state that Library and Information Science (LIS) is a « design 
science »23. In fact, it enables the better understanding of the information within its field and it 
promotes a sphere of activity that is guided by the aims that arise from it. It is obvious that, within
the set of sciences, Library Science belongs to the social sciences in contrast to the natural 
sciences. Strictly speaking, it is not a « social science » but rather a science of the artificial. Its 
purpose of study and its methods are based on the artificial (documents)24.
Regarding the scope of the term « design », Ilkka Niiniluoto thinks that Herbert Simon is 
somewhat ambiguous, because he does not clearly distinguish between « design » and « scientific 
design ». In this regard, he thinks that, « scientific design is a type of design, i.e. the activity of 
solving design problems by using scientific methods and scientific knowledge. Operations 
research provides methods to find optimal or satisfactory solutions to design problems (decision 
theory, linear programming, game theory). In this sense, scientific design is the result of the 
scientification of an art, a technology or a development »25.
According to this process, from a chronological point of view we might say that first there would 
be a professional human activity and then within a context of scientific activity we would obtain a
scientific design. In the case of LIS, we are faced with what Simon names a « science of the 
artificial ». It is presented as science of design and emerges from a process of « scientification » 
from a professional skill. It is not a purely formal knowledge, like logic or mathematics, nor is it 
obviously a discipline that arises from nature. Information Science could and might be seen as a 
social science to the extent that it is the result of social actions in a social context. But within 
them, it is not comparable to the economy or sociology. The difference is that the proper object 
and the design are – in a literal sense – artificial. In other words, economy and sociology are 
intensely rooted in the social nature of human beings, whereas LIS is inserted in further processes
of the basic needs.
If applying the approach of H. A. Simon, then both Information Science – in a broad sense – as 
well as Library Science are sciences of design and furthermore are empirical (understanding that 
this author believes that artificial intelligence is empirical)26. Indeed, the aims, means and results
of LIS can be evaluated empirically. In fact, this is what has been highlighted in recent years by 
emphasizing for example the role of users whose information needs and degree of satisfaction 
may be susceptible to empirical comparison. The same happens in the case of bibliometrics or in 
the evaluation processes of information « retrieval » instruments.
When characterizing the artificial sciences, Simon admits that natural sciences are concerned with
knowledge about objects and natural phenomena while the sciences of the artificial deal with 
what is produced by human operation27. Moreover, in his view five features that differentiate the 
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artificial with respect to the natural can be distinguished. These elements constitute the borders of
sciences of the artificial and provide a range of features in the field of study that will now be 
listed28 :
1. artificial objects are the product of a synthesis process (broadly understood : it is the 
articulation of a set of elements according to a previously elaborated design)29. Although, the 
results of a task performed by humans cannot always be prepared with full awareness ;
2. artificial objects can imitate the appearance of natural things, but lack one or more realistic 
aspects of natural things ;
3. man-made objects can be characterized in terms of aims, functions, and adaptation to the 
environment ;
4. artificial objects can be studied in imperative-hypothetical terms – that is, how they ought to be
to achieve certain aims – and also in a descriptive way such as what specific features characterize 
them. These two parameters are especially relevant in approaching the design process itself 
(indeed, engineers and more broadly, designers – certain profiles of IS practitioners too – reflect 
on how artificial objects should be in order to achieve specific aims and make them work) ;
5. from a functional standpoint, in order to achieve a purpose or to suit an aim, man-made objects 
require the interplay of three elements :
a) the purpose or aim in which it is directed ;
b) the nature of the artifact – its structure or configuration ;
c) the environment in which it acts.
This multiple perspective characterizes the sciences of the artificial30. In this sense, an artifact – 
what is artificially produced – can be studied as a meeting point, an interface between an internal 
level (the nature and structure of an artifact) and an external environment (the context in which it 
operates). To establish differences between natural sciences and the sciences of the artificial, 
H. Simon notes that the dichotomy between the normative and the descriptive is relevant. He 
considers that natural sciences « have found a way to exclude the normative and focus exclusively
on how things are »31. That is, the plane of the descriptive. He also believes that the sciences of 
the artificial always require a normative component.
Within the artificial sciences, Herbert A. Simon specifically highlights the « sciences of design ». 
He does so cautiously using the term « artificial » in the most neutral sense as used with the 
meaning « man-made » which is understood as something opposite or different from the 
natural32. Thus, he highlights the uses of « complex information processes » and « simulation of 
cognitive processes » against the most common meaning of « artificial intelligence »33. 
Something genuinely human is relied upon in the man-made : the design is something not found 
in nature.
The sciences of design arose in the mid-1970s at Carnegie Mellon University, in the city of 
Pittsburgh (Pennsylvania). For years they have been developed mainly through computer-aided 
design. This is being done on a regular basis in various degrees (Computer Science Centres, 
Schools of Architecture and Engineering, as well as in Operations Research Groups) within 
Business faculties and also in business schools that offer a Master of businnes administration. It is
clear that design is a content that relates to a specifically human endeavour34. It is « artificial » 
and is a human « artifact » in a broad sense (something that can be done by humans). This 
modulates its aims, means and results. Thus, the concept of « design » is teleological : always 
looking towards a purpose and in principle, aiming at an activity. As stated by H. Simon, « it is 
about how things should be ; try to design artifacts to achieve aims »35.
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Design activity appears as a task directed toward pre-selected purposes, which involve the 
decision factor : it is necessary to deliberate and choose what is most appropriate for the intended 
aim. Particularly due to the selection of aims and human nature, the methods of design are limited
since in fact, they don’t aspire to do as much as possible, but only to meet specific needs. In other 
words, the design activity does not seek to maximize – reach an optimal ideal – but only to 
satisfy36. In this case it appears that the number of alternatives is not unlimited.
To have a real design, it is not enough to simply create something that is possible because in fact, 
the design has only been achieved when a system is discovered where it is feasible on the basis of
the rules. On one hand, a field is needed where the process which corresponds to the design can 
take place ; but, on the other hand, all design is carried out following rules : for example, when 
designing a bibliographic record that contains a certain amount of information, in order to satisfy 
a particular profile of users, the steps that can be taken must be known – what rules there are – to 
represent the necessary information within a previously designed structure. The applicability of 
design according to the rules implies the existence of limits in the design, and these limits are 
directly related to its ability to adapt to reality. Consequently, the results are consistent with the 
existence of limitations.
It should be emphasized that the design activity is not unique to engineers. There are more 
professions that may design courses of action to change existing situations in order to give rise to 
others which are preferred. Thus, what H. Simon meant by « design » is directly related to 
prescribing : it is something done to achieve an aim explicitly sought. In this broad sense, the 
design « is at the core of all professional learning. It is the main feature that distinguishes 
professions and sciences »37. Its presence seems clearer in engineering, business administration 
and medicine, but is also considered in law schools or library science studies38, which is where 
the theoretical framework that gives meaning to this work is located.
It should be noted that H. Simon is particularly interested in the applied sciences of Design. There
are at least two reasons : first, because they arise from a process especially important in 
professional practice which I. Niiniluoto calls « scientification », i.e. it arose from a search for 
scientific foundations in a professional practice39 ; and secondly, because H. Simon always has 
in mind the need to solve problems and among them, a specific practical problem ; hence, its 
applied nature. The latter connects with his studies in two applied domains : business 
administration and computer science.
Final remarks
If Simon’s ideas are used for the discipline considered here, then Information Science – 
understood in a broad sense, which includes Library Science – can be characterized in the domain
of the sciences of design. This implies that Information Science (or what used to be called Library
and Information Science), in addition to being an empirical science, is also a science of the 
artificial rather than a social science (even though it has connections with the social aspects 
through users of the services of archives, libraries and documentation centres). In this regard, 
Information Science is empirical in a similar way to how Simon considers artificial intelligence to
be empirical40. The components of Information Science as an applied science (i.e. aims, 
processes and results) should be empirically tested.
Following this characterization of Information Science, there is a clear novelty. Information 
Science is an applied science of design rather than a social science as such or a mere technique of 
librarians. Its realm is the artificial being (documents in whatever format and support), which is 
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human made. The development of Information Science is built upon professional skills. In 
addition, this science of the artificial constantly uses information and communication 
technologies. These are operational tools whereas the core is a human undertaking.
This particular case of Information Science highlights the epistemological-methodological 
necessity of « applied science » rather than « basic science » in order to understand sciences of the
artificial as a group and within them, sciences of design. Without this category of applied science,
Information Science cannot be properly understood. Thus, we need the category of applied 
science as distinct to basic science at least from an epistemological-methodological point of view.
According to Niiniluoto, there are many elements needed for this notion of « applied science » ; 
hence here I have characterized the theoretical foundations of what used to be called Library and 
Information Science as a case of applied science within the realm of designs41.
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